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Abstract
Ownership interests in the traditional broadcast and
telecommunications media have been subject to restrictions by the
Communications Act of 1934, the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
and by FCC policies. For example, foreign ownership shares were
limited from the beginning and financial qualification regulations for
broadcasters were developed in 1965. In the 1970s, the Commission
adopted policies to promote minority ownership of broadcast media.
I have recently shown how one might measure the economic impact
of these ownership policies.'
The Internet has developed along rather different lines.
Although there was substantial government funding of the initial
backbone networks-ARPAnet and NSFnet, the provision of private
access via Internet service providers (ISPs) has been almost entirely
unregulated. The same is true for content providers-commercial
and non-profit, private and public. It now seems clear that "control"
of the Internet, in terms of both access and content, is moving to the
School of Information Management and Systems, University of California,
Berkeley.
1. Yale M. Braunstein, The FCC's Financial Qualification Requirements: Economic
Evaluation of a Barrer to Entry for Minority Broadcasters, 53 Fed. Comm. L.J. 69 (2000).
major communications and media firms. This raises questions about
the usefulness and applicability of the traditional regulatory models,
which I will raise only briefly. Disparities in access, whether on the
basis of income or geographic location, have arisen and are the
subject of most research on the "digital divide." My primary focus
will be on ownership issues, such as the concentration of ownership of
broadband access facilities, and the links between ownership of access
and of content.
I. Definition and Context
In the introductory material, the organizers of the 14 1h Annual
Computer Law Symposium define the digital divide as "the gap
between those who have access to information technology and those
who do not." Although several of the presentors argued for either
broadening or refocusing the definition to include access to quality
education and related areas,2 even if we stay with a narrower
approach, the concept remains somewhat unclear unless we become
more specific. One set of definitions involves ownership of a
computer with a graphical interface and a connection to the Internet.
For example, the recent Department of Commerce report, A Nation
Online: How Americans Are Expanding Their Use of the Internet,
focuses on "Internet use" and distinguishes between households and
individuals, on one hand, and having an Internet connection in the
home and using it, on the other. The authors report that as of
September 2001:
50.5 percent of households had Internet connections;
56.7 percent of the total U.S. population lived in households
with these connections;
43.6 percent of Americans were using the Internet in their
homes;
53.9 percent of the total population used the Internet at some
location.3
Another definitional approach draws on evolving Internet access
technology. One key determinant is broadband access or the lack
thereof. Even here definitional questions remain: Are we referring to
the availability or the use of broadband connections? If the latter,
what factors determine the adoption of broadband once it is
2. See, for example, [in this issue]
3. U.S. Dept. of Comm., Econ. and Statistics Admin. and NatI. Telecomm. and Info.
Admin., A Nation Online: How Americans Are Expanding Their Use of the Internet,
<http://www.esa.doc/gov/508/esa/nationoline.hmtl> (February 2002).
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available?
Discussions of policies to promote access (in both North
America and Europe) often seem to ignore questions related to who
provides the access. While this is normal in the broadband context, it
is unusual in the broader contexts of telecommunications and
broadcast media. In other telecom and media discussions, this area is
known as "ownership" or industry structure. For example, the
linkages between ownership, on the one hand, and access and
content, on the other, are addressed in the various editions of Who
Owns the Media, which also provides detailed lists of media owners
and their interests.'
Furthermore, the question of "access to what?" is also generally
ignored when discussing the digital divide. In other
telecommunications and media discussions this area is known as
"content." Policy concerns about content go at least as far back as
former FCC Chairman Newton Minow's "vast wasteland" speech in
1961.' Generally, the Commission has refrained from direct
regulation of content for First Amendment reasons. Nevertheless,
there is a continuing understanding that decisions about media
structure do influence content.6
The focus of the remainder of this paper is that issues related to
ownership of the Internet-both of carriers and of content-should
be addressed explicitly as they are likely to affect both access and use.
The approach is to look at trends in telecommunications and
broadcasting for lessons that may be applicable to the Internet. This
leads to two major principles:
1. Discussions of the digital divide should include
ownership/industry structure and content components as well as
access.
2. Even without accepting #1, industry structure still affects
(broadband) access.
II. Policies to Promote Access
There are several categories of policies to promote access. In the
4. Ben Compaine, Who Owns the Media?: Competition and Concentration in the
Mass Media Industry (3rd ed., 2000).
5. Newton N. Minnow, Speech to the National Association of Broadcasters, May 9,
1961 (Available at: http://www.janda.org/b20/News%20articles/vastwastland.htm).
6. See e.g. P. 0. Steiner, Program Patterns and Preferences, and the Workability of
Competition in Radio Broadcasting, 66 Q. J. of Econ. 194-223 (May 1952) ; B. Owen,
Economics and the Freedom of Expression: Media Structure and the First Amendment
(Ballinger, 1975).
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telephoneindustry, price regulation, interconnection requirements,
and cross-subsidization-both overt and hidden-have been used as
part of a "universal service" strategy to promote the penetration of
telephones with over 90 percent of occupied housing units having
telephone service since 1980.' In broadcasting, a "localism" model
attempted to maximize the number of communities with at least one
commercial radio broadcaster. This approach, modified for the
reduced number of channels, was then applied to television
broadcasting. The initial infrastructure of what was to become the
Internet received subsidies in the form of the initial funding of the
backbone and regional networks. The transfer in the mid-1990s from
government/military/academic use to public/commercial use was
accompanied by regulatory forbearance.
Discussions over access to traditional telecommunications service
are commonly classified under the heading of "universal service."
Mueller provides a historical analysis of how the meaning changed
from the interconnection of competing network providers to the
provision of service to the nation's households and businesses with
the growth of the Bell System.8 Following the passage of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, formerly hidden cross-subsidies
have become more explicit. Recent research has focused on how
competition9, convergence °, and the "doom of common carriage""
are affecting universal service concerns.
On the broadcast side, the choice was between maximizing the
number of cities that had stations (localism) or the number of
stations, and therefore networks, that could be received by the typical
household (regionalism). 2 This trade-off was especially important in
the allocation of VHF television licenses between 1945 and 1948, and
the FCC's preference for localism was made explicit in its DuMont
7. U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States, Table 910 (2000
edition).
8. M. L. Mueller, Universal Service In Telephone History: A Reconstruction,
Telecomm. Policy 12, 352-69 (July 1993).
9. See T. M. Valletti, Introduction: Symposium on Universal Service Obligation and
Competition, Info. Econ. and Policy 12, 205-210 (September 2000) and the other articles in
that issue.
10. See e.g. J. R. Schement, R. R. Pressman & L. Povich, Paper Preseneted,
Transcending Access Toward a New Universal Service (Universal Service in Context: A
Multidisciplinary Perspective, New York Law School, December 6, 1995)
<http://www.benton.org/Policy/Uniserv/Conference/transcend.html>.
11. Eli M. Noam, Beyond Liberalization: The Impending Doom of Common
Carriage, 18 Telecommunications Policy 435 (1994).
12. Roger G. Noll, Merton. J. Peck & John J. McGowan, Economic Aspects of
Television Regulation, 99-101 (Brookings Inst., 1973).
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decision, which restricted the number of VHF stations in most
markets to two or three. 3 The works of Steiner and Owen focused on
the number of competing outlets in a market and the structure of that
market, respectively.'4 The overall conclusion was that, for a given
organizational arrangement, the more competing outlets, the greater
the diversity in programming. These issues continue to be debated
today in discussions of the national network ownership cap, the dual-
station rule, and the prohibition of satellite broadcasters from
offering out-of-region network affiliates.
The issue then is whether any of these approaches apply to an
interactive world. It is necessary to ask a few basic questions: First,
how interactive is web browsing? If it is not very interactive, maybe
one or more of the "old" approaches is sufficient. Second, how many
of those online create content? A related question is whether this is
an important concern or whether the ability to create content is the
issue. In either case, do we then need to focus on content-creation
skills and access to web servers and resources? These fundamental
questions are addressed both by other papers in this symposium and,
on a more practical level, by work such as the Creating Community
Connections project at Massachusetts Instistue of Technology.'5
Regardless of whether interactivity changes the dimensions of
access, there is evidence that industry structure plays an important
role in access. This is as true for broadband Internet access as it is for
the telecommunications and broadcasting cases described above. A
Nation Online shows clearly that income levels affect both computer
and Internet use" and online activities." The report also discusses the
role of cost of Internet access alone and the interplay between cost
and income as barriers to home Internet connections. 8 There is
evidence that increasing concentration in the provision of DSL
broadband service to homes has been accompanied by an increase in
the price of that service. Looking at one specific case, incumbent
local exchange carrier (ILEC) SBC/Pacific Bell raised its monthly
rates for residential ADSL in California from $39.95 to $49.95 in
February 2001. During the five quarters from early 2000 to early
13. Sixth Report on Television Allocations, Fed.Commun. comm Radio Regulations
91:601 (April 14, 1952).
14. See supra n. 5.
15. Randal D. Pinkett, The Creating Community Connections (C3) System Project
Report submitted to the U.S. Dep. of Com., Ars Portalis Final Report (June 18, 2001).
16. A Nation Online, supre n. 3 10, fig. 2-2.
17. Id.,33, tbl3-1.
18. Id., pp. 76-78.
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2001, the ILEC share of the DSL market increased from just below
75% to 83% while the competitive local exchange carriers (the
CLECs) share declined from 23.7% to 16.2%. During the first
quarter of 2001, the time of the price increase, the ILEC's share of the
residential market increased from approximately 88% to over 90%.19
(Inter-exchange carriers serve the remaining share of the market.)
IlI. Policies to Promote Ownership Diversity
Ownership diversity and industry structure have been subject to
an inconsistent mix of policies across media types. There have been a
variety of approaches and debates relating to ownership of new
wireless carriers and cable and broadcast television providers, each of
which provides lessons for similar questions involving the Internet.
A. Wireless Telephony
Diversity of ownership issues have arisen in the licensing of
another new technology, cellular telephone service. The original set
of licenses was originally awarded following comparative hearings.
The parties incurred significant expenses and were subject to lengthy
time delays. The comparative hearings were replaced by auctions,
which led to high prices, limiting the role of small and minority-
owned businesses. To partially address this situation Congress
allowed for "designated entities" in the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1993 with the stated objective of:
... promoting economic opportunity and competition
and ensuring that new and innovative technologies are
readily accessible to the American people by avoiding
excessive concentration of licenses and by
disseminating licenses among a wide variety of
applicants, including small businesses, rural telephone
companies, and businesses owned by members of
minority groups and women ... 20
In discussing the intent of this provision, Munson states:
The House Report explained the second objective in
further detail. First, the committee intended the FCC
to use a common sense approach to avoid
concentration of licenses, not any particular test ....
Finally, the [House] committee included minority
19. Yale M. Braunstein, Market Power and Price Increases in the DSL Market
<available at: http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/-bigyale/dsl.html> (July 2001).
20. 47 U.S.C. § 3090)(3).
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groups and women in order to ensure that such
individuals would not be excluded by the competitive
bidding system.21
Despite the stated intention, the application of this provision in
the 1996 PCS auction proved unrealistic. Several of the "successful"
bidders failed to obtain the necessary financing and filed for
protection under the bankruptcy statutes. So far there is no
resolution, but it is interesting to note that the solution considered
and rejected by the last session of Congress dealt only with NextWave
and ignored the parallel situation of those bidders with substantial
minority ownership.22
B. Cable Television
In many aspects the debate over "separations" policy for cable
television provides a rich set of parallels.23 Several times, the FCC
and the courts were faced with the question of whether common
carriage and the separation of program production from ownership of
local facilities via a system of channel leasing, on one hand, or
allowing integration between program producers and local operators,
on the other, was the appropriate model for the cable industry. This
came to a head in 1979 when the Supreme Court ruled in Midwest
Video, which concern public access requirements, that cable television
did not constitute common carriage."
Broadcasting
There have been competing and overlapping trends in the
development and application of minority ownership policy in
broadcasting. Policies and decisions encouraging minority ownership
have included:
1. Nondiscrimination Employment Practices25 (1968)
21. Mark W. Munson, A Legacy of Lost Opportunity: Designated Entities and the
Federal Communication Commission's Broadband PCS Spectrum Auction, 7 Mich.
Telecomm. Tech. L. Rev. 217 (2001) <http://www.mttlr.org/volseven/Munson.html>.
22. H.R. 3484, Prompt Utilization of Wireless Spectrum Act of 2001, (Dec. 13,2001).
23. See e.g. Fred H. Cate, Donna N. Lampert & Frank W. Lloyd, Cable Television
Leased Access (The Annenberg Washington Program in Communications
Policy Studies of Northwestern University, Washington, D.C., 1991)
<http://www.annenberg.nwu.edu/pubs/cable/>
24. Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir. 1978), aff'd 440 U.S. 689
(1979).
25. Nondiscrimination Employment Practices for Broadcast Licensees, Memorandum
Opinion and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 13 FCC 2d 766, para., 26, 13
Radio Reg. 2d (P&F) 1645 (1968).
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2. Minority Tax Certificates26 (1978-1995)
3. Distress Sale Policy
7 (1978), declared unconstitutional 198928
4. Metro Broadcasting29 (1990)
Among the policies and decisions that worked in the other
direction are:




3. Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod 2 (1998)
Adarand, of course, was not a broadcast license decision, but the
overall result of it and the other decisions is that it is now legal to give
preferences to small businesses but not explicitly to minorities or
women.
Possibly the most important policy changes affecting station
ownership are the move toward spectrum auctions-raising the price
of the spectrum for all purposes, the lifting of the station ownership
limits,33 and the grants of additional spectrum to the existing
television broadcast licensees. 34 Each of these has increased the price
of new and existing licenses and, as a result, raised barriers to entry.
One can quantify the costs to the minority community of policies that
create barriers to entry, thereby reducing or eliminating the prospects
for diversity in ownership of broadcast facilities.35
26. 26 U.S.C. § 1071 (1982) and 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.1071-3 (1989). For a recent
reappraisal, see E. G. Krasnow & L. M. Fowlkes (1999). "The FCC's Minority Tax
Certificate Program: A Proposal for Life After Death," Fed. Comm. L. J. 51(3): 665.
27. Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of Broadcast Facilities, Public Notice,
68 FCC. 2d 979, 983 (1978), 42 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 1689, 1695-96 (1978). For an analysis,
see also Lebowitz, FCC Minority Distress Sale Policy: Public Interest v. the Public's
Interest, Wis. L. Rev. 365 (1981).
28. Shurberg Broadcasting of Hartford, Inc. v. FCC, 876 F.2d 902 (D.C. Cir. 1989),
rev'd 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
29. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC , 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
30. Ultravision Broadcasting Co., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 1 FCC. 2d 544, 5
Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 343 (1965), modified, 72 F.C.C. 2d 784, 45 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 925
(1979).
31. Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 200 (1995).
32. Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. FCC (1998), 141 F 3d 344, 344 (D.C. Cir.).
33. See e.g. The Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56,
47 U.S.C. § 202(h) (West 1996), which directs the FCC to review these policies every two
years, and Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1027 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
34. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 336 (West 1994), and Thomas G
Krattenmaker, The Telecommunications Act of 1996, 49 Fed. Comm. L. J., (November,
1996).
35. Yale M. Braunstein, The FCC's Financial Qualification Requirements: Economic
Evaluation of a Barrier to Entry for Minority Broadcasters, 53 Federal Communications
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Internet
The ownership models for the Internet is a changing mix. The
current model can be characterized as hierarchy with backbones and
internet exchange points owned by very large carriers with a mix of
large and small ISPs providing access at the retail level. The Tier-1
ISPs generally have access to the global Internet Routing Table and
do not buy network capacity from other providers. Examples include
Cable & Wireless (C&W), Sprint, Qwest, AT&T, and Worldcom. The
Tier-2 ISPs lease part or all of their network and generally have a
national or nearly-national presence. Examples include AOL,
Earthlink, and former cable-based ISPs such as @home. The Tier-3
ISPs are regional, with no national backbone.
These definitions are not quite so clear in practice.36 Depending
on changes in the market and on the prospects for legislation such as
the pending "Tauzin-Dingell" bill, there may be additional
consolidation.37 Tauzin-Dingell would permit ILEC entry into Level
1, possibly leading to further ILEC control of DSL, with the effect of
driving out smaller ISPs.
Drawing a parallel with broadcasting, there may be a relationship
between the number of smaller, locally-owned ISPs and content.38
Similarly, there may be a relationship between diversity in ownership
and diversity in content. Also, with ILEC entry into Tier 1, there is
the possibility for tying arrangements and bottlenecks. One question
is whether these issues that have arisen in the broadcasting and
telecommunications contexts also apply to the Internet.
Law Journal 69-90 (December 2000).
36. See Rob Frieden, Without Public Peer: The Potential Regulatory and Universal
Service Consequences of Internet Balkanization, 3 Va. J. L. & Tech. 8 (Fall 1998) and Rob
Frieden, Revenge of the Bellheads: How the Netheads Lost Control of the Internet,
(forthcoming, 2002).
37. The Internet Freedom and Broadband Deployment Act (H.R. 1542), (passed by
the House, February 27) (2002).
38. Economics, supra n. 5, and Yale M. Braunstein, The Potential for Increased
Competition in Television Broadcasting-Can the Market Work?, Telecommunications
Policy and the Citizen (T. Haight ed. Praeger, 1979).
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This point was the basis for a recent editorial in the trade press:
[The relationship between diveristy in ownership and
diversity in content is] the crucial reason independent
ISPs should be protected from telco dominance. This
is far more than a business competition issue, but
rather goes right to primary concerns about diverse
points of view and innovative new uses of the net.
Cable TV notoriously blocks most channels, providing
a "walled garden" of limited choice. This must not be
extended to the Internet, but DSL providers like SBC
(one third of the country) have exactly that in their
plans. Contracts SBC demands of ISPs force video
speed traffic to bypass the ISP and go directly to SBC
and pay an extraordinary toll. Mike Powell spoke
eloquently to me two years ago, about how the
availability of video on the net would allow choices far
beyond broadcast TV, and how such innovation must
not be choked off.
That's why we need independents. DV cameras, Avids
and Mac editing, and other inexpensive video tools
will soon make it possible for hundreds of churches to
webcast their Sunday services. Every college with a
football or basketball team can broadcast to their
campus and the rest of the world. Texas could receive
TV channels from Punjab, Israel, Poland, Italy, and
the U.S. Navy. Comcast won't carry them, forbidding
video in their terms of service. SBC plans the same,
seeing this as a "value-add" and finding technical
means of effectively blocking programming. Cisco
proudly explains how their routers can select
preferred channels. 9
But there is a separate industry structure issue, even if content is
not affected. And as I have discussed in Section II above, industry
structure influences prices and access.
IV. Conclusion
Both economic theory and empirical evidence point to linkage
between ownership issues, concentration, and industry structure-on
one hand-and broadband prices and the adoption of technologies
39. D. Burstein, Editorial: Tell the Chairman <http://www.dslprime.com/> (April 30,
2002).
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such as xDSL on the other. This connection has been acknowledged
in the trade press and elsewhere."° Policies that keep the price of
Internet access high exacerbate the digital divide, and policies that
keep the price of broadband access high intensify the differences in
access of differing income groups.
In conclusion, the evidence as to whether ownership and industry
structure affect content is mixed. The theoretical relationship
between increasing the number of separately owned and controlled
outlets and increasing diversity of content is clear and supported by
empirical evidence. But the linkage between specific types of owners
and content is less clear and still the subject of debate.4' There is
somewhat stronger evidence that industry structure and regulation
has directly affected possibilities for entry and the distribution of
wealth in the traditional broadcast media42, and is having similar
effects in new media and Internet industries. 3
40. Id.
41. A. S. Hammond, IV, Measuring the Nexus: The Relationship Between Minority
Ownership and Broadcast Diversity after Metro Broadcasting, 51 Fed. Comm. L. J. 627
(May 1999).
42. Id.
43. M. Ford-Livene, The Digital Dilemma: Ten Challenges Facing Minority-Owned
New Media Ventures, 51 Fed. Comm. L. J. 577, 597-599 (May 1999).
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